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We present modeling of the COVID-19 epidemic in Illinois, USA, capturing the implementation of
a Stay-at-Home order and scenarios for its eventual release. We use a non-Markovian age-of-infection
model that is capable of handling long and variable time delays without changing its model topology.
Bayesian estimation of model parameters is carried out using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods. This framework allows us to treat all available input information, including both the
previously published parameters of the epidemic and available local data, in a uniform manner. To
accurately model deaths as well as demand on the healthcare system, we calibrate our predictions to
total and in-hospital deaths as well as hospital and ICU bed occupancy by COVID-19 patients. We
apply this model not only to the state as a whole but also its sub-regions in order to account for the
wide disparities in population size and density. Without prior information on non-pharmaceutical
interventions (NPIs), the model independently reproduces a mitigation trend closely matching
mobility data reported by Google and Unacast. Forward predictions of the model provide robust
estimates of the peak position and severity and also enable forecasting the regional-dependent results
of releasing Stay-at-Home orders. The resulting highly constrained narrative of the epidemic is able
to provide estimates of its unseen progression and inform scenarios for sustainable monitoring and
control of the epidemic.
On January 24, 2020, the second known COVID-19
case to be diagnosed in the USA was reported in Chicago,
Illinois. Community transmission of the disease was con-
firmed on March 8, 2020. During the subsequent ten days,
the epidemic grew with a case doubling time of approx-
imately 2.3 days, while testing capacity was essentially
fixed. On March 21, 2020, a Stay-at-Home order was
issued for the entire state of Illinois and subsequently
extended on March 31, 2020 and again on April 23, 2020.
The order was lifted on May 30, 2020 [1]. Responsible re-
laxation of the mitigation of COVID-19 must be informed
by realistic and well-calibrated epidemiological modeling
of the outcomes of any scenarios under consideration—not
just of the resulting (increased) death toll but also of the
stress placed upon the healthcare system. The purpose
of this report is to present such an analysis.
A variety of modeling approaches are used by hospi-
tals, public health officials, and state governments. These
range between phenomenological models that use a curve-
fitting procedure to match data, such as the daily death
rate, and mechanistic methods that model the trajectory
of the epidemic as individuals transition through several
disease and healthcare-bound stages [2–5]. Only mech-
anistic models are able to make justifiable predictions
while accounting for changes in the epidemic environ-
ment, such as the imposition or relaxation of community
mitigation efforts. Of these, compartmental models like
the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) models, and
Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) exten-
sions, are widely used. Compartmental models describe
how fractions of a homogeneous, well-mixed population
progress through different states the disease, driven by
interactions between infectious and susceptible individu-
als. In the simplest models, the dynamics is deterministic
and the rates are constant in time, but many variants and
extensions exist and are widely used.
In order to be practically useful, models must be cal-
ibrated to observed data [4, 6–8]. We calibrate the im-
portant dynamics of the model to several simultaneous
streams of empirical data including total and in-hospital
deaths, as well as hospital and ICU bed occupancy by
COVID-19 patients. To avoid biases resulting from non-
uniform and non-constant testing rates, which may be
difficult to parameterize, we do not consider positive case
data. The resulting model is a description of the epidemic
as it progresses through the hospital system in Illinois;
as it is clear that a non-negligible number of COVID-19
deaths occur outside the hospital environment (e.g., in
homes and nursing homes especially), we augment our
model with an effective description of the net incidence
of deaths due to COVID-19.
There are many limitations to the types of models
that we and others use to describe COVID-19, and these
have been explored extensively in the literature, especially
with regards to spatial structure [9], superspreader events
and individuals [10–13], and the structure of contact net-
works [14–16]. A geographical region as large as the state
of Illinois is not well-described as homogeneous, due to
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2large variations in population density and prevalence of
infection between the Chicago metropolitan area and the
more rural regions in Central and Southern Illinois. In-
deed, most of the known cases and deaths to date have
occurred in the Chicago area (by roughly by an order
of magnitude), so in practice this region dominates our
results for the state as a whole.
One cannot simply scale the results of models for the
Chicago metropolitan area to the entire state, however,
because the transmission characteristics depend on the
frequency and duration of contacts, which likely vary sig-
nificantly among geographical regions. For this reason,
we simulate the dense urban areas and the three sparser,
more rural areas separately. We note that a more refined
treatment would account for transfers between these sep-
arate populations, as well as transfers into and out of
the state as a whole; however, we do not currently model
these processes. The number of cases in individual rural
areas is sufficiently small, due to the early Stay-at-Home
order, that a long phase of exponential growth in these
regions was largely avoided. As a result, these populations
are not well-described by continuum, deterministic mod-
els. Nevertheless, by aggregating these populations, the
numbers are large enough that deterministic, exponential
growth, at least at the early stages, was visible.
In this work, we describe an estimate of the rise and
fall of the epidemic within Illinois, taking into account the
modulation of the transmission parameters due to social
distancing. In the following sections, we first describe our
extension of the SEIR model, which takes into account the
long and variable delay times reported in the literature.
After describing the procedure by which we calibrate
the model to data, we argue for the robustness of short
term model predictions. Finally, we present and discuss
our predictions of the epidemic trajectory through the
Summer of 2020, including the effects of the release of
the Stay-at-Home order at the end of May.
I. MODEL DESCRIPTION
To facilitate a general treatment of delay times
in the COVID-19 epidemic, we implement a non-
Markovian model that derives from the classic Kermack-
McKendrick age-of-infection model [17]. Age-of-infection
models are similar to compartmental models, such as
Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) or Susceptible-
Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) models, but allow
transition delays between entering sequential states to be
drawn from arbitrary probability density functions (see,
e.g. [4, 18]). We use non-Markovian models because
their delays can be defined by an arbitrary number of
timescales, in contrast to the single exponential rate pa-
rameter of compartment based models. Non-Markovian
models are thus, in principle, better able to reproduce the
observed signal delays between different states, e.g., the
flattening of the curve of hospital admissions compared
to in-hospital deaths.
The use of deterministic rather than stochastic epi-
demic descriptions is generally justified when the modeled
populations are large enough that relative daily changes
are small and the number of individuals is large relative
to one. This means that a deterministic compartmental
model has a self-consistency check, because once the epi-
demic size is of order unity, a stochastic model allows
the epidemic to die out; in contrast, in a deterministic
model an epidemic will continue to evolve even with a
unrealistic, fractional number of infectious individuals.
We will see that for some regions of Illinois, our estimates
are at the limit of validity of deterministic models.
We adapt the conventional age-of-infection model to
include a number of delayed healthcare system observ-
ables of the epidemic, such as the number of patients in
hospitals, Intensive Care Units (ICUs), and ultimately,
the number of deaths.
A. Time-modulated age-of-infection model
The core of our model is the daily incidence (i.e., the
number of newly-infected individuals) in demographic
(age) group i, ji(t). This value determines the dynamics
of susceptible individuals in that group Si(t) according to
dSi(t)
dt
= −ji(t). (1)
The incidence itself follows the renewal equation,
ji(t) = Rt
Si(t)
S(t)
∑
m
ξim
∞∫
0
dτ Kserial(τ)jm(t− τ). (2)
Here, Rt is time-dependent effective reproduction num-
ber, S(t) =
∑
i Si(t) is the total susceptible population,
Kserial(τ) is the probability density function (PDF) of se-
rial intervals, and ξim is the contact matrix. For simplicity,
we assume ξim = 1, i.e., all demographic groups infect
each other at the same rate. We assume that Ni, the
total number of individuals in the demographic group i, is
approximately constant for the duration of the epidemic.
In practice, this means our model neglects the effects of
births, deaths due to causes unrelated to COVID-19, and
mobility of the population, which is appropriate for the
short time scales we model. We further assume that indi-
viduals are only infected once, i.e., that the duration of
immunity to COVID-19 is longer than the timescale over
which we simulate the epidemic. Our simulations begin
on a day ts (whose value we sample during parameter
inference) at which point we impose that ten people are
spontaneously infected, setting ji(t) in proportion to the
age distribution of the population under study.
We parameterize the effective reproduction number Rt
in terms of the basic reproduction number R0, a seasonal
forcing factor F (t), a mitigation factor M(t), and the
susceptible population fraction S(t)/N according to
Rt = R0F (t)M(t)
S(t)
N
. (3)
3The formal dependence of Rt on the total susceptible pop-
ulation S(t) is corrected in Eq. 2 by a factor Si(t)/S(t)
which accounts for possible variation of susceptibility be-
tween different demographic groups. In our model, the
homogeneous factor M(t) accounts for all sources of miti-
gation, including the effects of self-imposed isolation as
well as government-mandated Stay-at-Home (SAH) or-
ders, school closures, etc. We parameterize M(t) as a
piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating polynomial that
smoothly interpolates from 1 at t0 to M(t1) at t1 and is
otherwise constant. The mitigation factor M(t1), start
time, and end time of the interpolation interval are fitted
by our algorithm. We choose to parameterize M(t) as a
single transition (i.e., a single event) since this minimal
model reduces the risk of overfitting to spurious trends.
This choice is supported by the following observations:
the adoption of social distancing practices took place rel-
atively rapidly over a one to two week period; and the
Stay-at-Home order remained active after the initial tran-
sition, presumably suppressing the magnitude of changes
to mitigation. We will observe that this choice is a suffi-
cient approximation for the duration of the data we use
for calibration. We evaluate these claims more explicitly
Section III D.
To model seasonal effects, we follow Ref. [19], which
estimates seasonal forcing from the observed seasonal
variability of positive tests in three other endemic coron-
aviruses. We thus adopt the functional form
F (t) = 1 +ASF cos
(
2pi(t− tpeak)
365
)
, (4)
where ASF denotes the strength of the forcing and tpeak
sets the day of the year when seasonal forcing is strongest.
From Ref. [19], we infer that seasonal forcing is strongest
in the winter and set tpeak = January 16.
Ref. [19] finds evidence for ASF = 0.2; however, we
account for uncertainty in this parameter by sampling
over ASF during parameter inference. Incorporating this
uncertainty is critical: if mitigation were only able to
reduce the effective reproduction number to roughly unity,
then seasonal forcing could drive a second wave of the
epidemic.
For timescales of only a few months, our parameter-
ization of Rt includes a degeneracy: a change in the
parameter ASF may be compensated by adjusting the
mitigation profile M(t). The degeneracy is broken as
data is collected over long timescales, since M(t) mod-
els relatively instantaneous changes in infectiousness and
F (t) produces an explicitly year-long, periodic modula-
tion. Practically, this implies that ASF may account for
both seasonal effects and concurrent slow variations in
the mitigation factor.
B. Model topology
Due to limited and biased testing, neither the sus-
ceptible population Si(t) nor the daily incidence of new
infection cases ji(t) are directly observable. Hence, we are
forced to infer the dynamics of the epidemic using lagging
and indirect indicators. These indicators include the total
number of hospitalized (but not critical) patients H(t),
the number of critically ill patients currently in ICU beds
C(t), and D(t), the cumulative number of daily deaths in
the hospital.
Our model topology assumes that all hospital deaths
occur in ICU rooms. In practice, this simplification would
be invalid if either a significant number of individuals
die immediately upon entering the hospital (i.e., if the
true delay distribution between hospitalization and death
is appreciably bimodal), or if the number of hospital
decedents exceeds the number of individuals who are
admitted to the ICU. In this sense, our inferred parameter
values, e.g., the probability of a patient in critical care
dying, should not be interpreted as having real-world
meaning, since the values accommodate approximations
in order to fit all input data.
Furthermore, by separating the observables from the
incidence dynamics, our model supposes that that the
hospitalization status of an individual does not affect their
likelihood of infecting someone. This choice is appropriate
if the number of hospitalized individuals is a small fraction
of the total number of infected individuals, or if the delay
between infection and hospitalization is longer than the
serial interval.
The dynamics of the system may be described by daily
flux variables:
• σi(t), the number of infected individuals who be-
come symptomatic
• hi(t), the number of daily admissions to all hospitals
• ri(t), the daily number of patients discharged from
all hospitals
• ci(t), the daily number of patients transferred from
the main floor of a hospital to its ICU
• vi(t), the daily number of patients transferred from
the ICU to the main floor of a hospital, and
• di(t), the daily number of deaths in ICU rooms.
We do not directly model deaths that happen outside of
hospitals but instead infer the ratio of these deaths to the
hospital deaths during our fitting procedure, as described
below. Figure 1 schematically depicts the topology of our
model along with the names of all flux and cumulative
variables.
The dynamics of any flux variable y(t) defined above
may be obtained from the variable x(t) directly preceding
it in the chain of events shown in Fig. 1:
y(t) = py
∞∫
0
dτ Ky(τ)x(t− τ). (5)
Here, py is the proportion of individuals undergoing the
transition x→ y with time delays distributed according
4ICU,  C(t)
Symptom onset
Daily incidents
Hospitalized,   H(t)
Deaths, D(t)
(hospital)
Recovered
(discharged)
× 𝑹𝒕𝑺(𝒕)
× 𝒑𝝈 × 𝒑𝒉
× 𝒑𝒅
c(t)
r(t)
d(t)
v(t)
h(t)j(t)
× 𝒑𝒄
s(t)
Deaths, Dtot(t)
(total)
dtot(t)
× 𝑭𝐭𝐨𝐭
FIG. 1. The topology of our model along with the names
of all flux and state variables: the daily incidence, ji(t); the
daily number of newly symptomatic individuals, σi(t); the
number of daily admissions to all hospitals, hi(t); the daily
number of patients discharged from all hospitals, ri(t); the
daily number of patients transferred from the main floor of
a hospital to its ICU, ci(t); the daily number of patients
transferred from the ICU to the main floor of a hospital, vi(t);
the daily number of deaths in hospitals, di(t); and the daily
number of deaths in and out of hospitals, dtot,i(t). State
variables are: the total number of occupied hospital beds
(main floor) Hi(t), and the total number of occupied ICU beds
Ci(t). The other parameters of the model are the fractions of
infected individuals who ever become symptomatic, pσ,i; the
fraction of symptomatic individuals who are ever hospitalized,
ph,i; the fraction of hospital patients who ever get to ICU,
pc,i; and the fraction of ICU patients who will ultimately die
pd,i; and the multiplier, Ftot that converts between hospital
deaths and all deaths in the state, including those outside of
the hospital system. For the sake of legibility, we suppress
age-group indices in the diagram.
to a probability density function Ky(t). Note that Eq. 2
has the same structure except that both the input x and
the output y variables are given by the daily incidence
ji(t).
For the flux variables defined above, one obtains the
following equations. The number of infected individuals
who become symptomatic is
σi(t) = pσ,i
∞∫
0
dτ Kσ(τ)ji(t− τ), (6)
where pσ,i is the (age-dependent) fraction of infected
individuals who ever develop symptoms and Kσ(τ) is
the PDF of the incubation period. The fraction ph,i of
symptomatic individuals who are ever admitted to the
hospital is
hi(t) = ph,i
∞∫
0
dτ Kh(τ)σi(t− τ). (7)
The flux of hospital patients who become critically ill and
are admitted to the ICU is given by
ci(t) = pc,i
∞∫
0
dτ Kc(τ)hi(t− τ), (8)
of which a fraction pd,i ultimately die according to
di(t) = pd,i
∞∫
0
dτ Kd(τ)ci(t− τ). (9)
The fraction 1 − pd,i of ICU patients who stabilize and
return to the general ward of the hospital do so according
to
vi(t) = (1− pd,i)
∞∫
0
dτ Kv(τ)ci(t− τ). (10)
Both stabilized patients and hospital patients who recover
without requiring critical care are discharged, thus the
influx of recovered individuals due to hospital discharges
is given by
ri(t) =
∞∫
0
dτ Kr(τ) [(1− pc,i)hi(t− τ) + vi(t− τ)] .
(11)
Finally, to approximately account for patients who
die outside of the hospital system, we introduce dtot, a
variable that tracks the total number of daily deaths
both within and outside of the hospital. We connect to-
tal deaths to hospital deaths d according to a prefactor
Ftot ≥ 1 and delay time τtot that reflects bureaucratic
delays associated with issuing deaths certificate and pub-
lishing data on the Illinois Department of Public Health
(IDPH) website. We observe that these bureaucratic de-
lays manifest themselves in strong day-of-the-week effects.
dtot,i(t) = Ftot
∞∫
0
dτ Ktot(τ)di(t− τ). (12)
In our simulations, we draw on clinical data to specify
the age-dependent rates for hospitalization, ICU admis-
sion, and death. We report the details of this severity
model in Table S1. To account for differences between
the literature values and what has occurred in Illinois,
we introduce age-independent prefactors for the transi-
tion rates and fit them in our simulations. Although the
relative severity values we use may not be accurate, in
practice this choice does not affect our model dynamics.
Because the contact matrix ξim is constant across all
interactions, and because the susceptibility is not a func-
tion of demographic group, the demographic-aggregated
statistics are insensitive to the relative demographic ratios.
Then, since we only fit data that has been summed over
5all age groups, we cannot observe any differences caused
by inaccurate severity ratios.
The instantaneous occupation of hospital beds H(t)
and of ICU beds C(t) may be obtained by integrating the
incoming and outgoing fluxes as
H(t) =
∑
i
t∫
0
dt′ [hi(t′)− ci(t′) + vi(t′)− ri(t′)] (13)
C(t) =
∑
i
t∫
0
dt′ [ci(t′)− vi(t′)− di(t′)] , (14)
while the cumulative numbers of hospital and total deaths
are
D(t) =
∑
i
t∫
0
dt′ di(t′) (15)
Dtot(t) =
∑
i
t∫
0
dt′ dtot,i(t′). (16)
II. PARAMETER INFERENCE
We calibrate our model to data by sampling over the
high-dimensional model parameter space using a Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach, as has been done
by many others for epidemics in general (see, e.g. [7, 20])
and also for COVID-19 (see, e.g. for applications in
China [21], Mexico [22] and Italy [23]). While standard op-
timization techniques can also identify the best-fit model
parameters, we use MCMC because it produces an es-
timate of the global posterior probability distribution.
With the full distribution, we can motivate bounds on
parameter uncertainty, explore correlations between pa-
rameters, and identify model idiosyncrasies. Access to the
full distribution also provides a direct means to marginal-
ize over some modeling uncertainties when forecasting the
future trajectory of the epidemic.
A. Markov chain Monte Carlo methods
Given a set of model parameters ~Θ and data ~D, the
input to the MCMC sampler comprises a prior pi(~Θ) and
a likelihood function L( ~D|~Θ). The sampler computes the
posterior probability p(~Θ| ~D) for each point in parameter
space according to Bayes’s theorem
p(~Θ| ~D) = L(
~D|~Θ)pi(~Θ)
Z( ~D) . (17)
The likelihood L represents the probability of observing
the data D given a model with input parameters ~Θ, and
the prior pi encodes our expectation for the probability
of a given set of model parameters ~Θ. Because we only
compare points within the posterior distribution for an
individual set of data, we neglect the constant model
evidence by setting Z( ~D) = 1. In practice, the MCMC
sampling recovers the log of the posterior probability
distribution H ≡ ln p+ const, which combines both type
of inputs according to
H(~Θ| ~D) = ln
[
L( ~D|~Θ)
]
−
∑
α
(
Θα −Θ(0)α
)2
2∆2α
. (18)
Here, the second term is the log of the prior over the
model parameters; for each parameter we either imple-
ment a Gaussian prior with mean expected value Θ
(0)
α
and variance ∆2α, or we use a flat prior in which case the
parameter does not appear in the sum.
This Bayesian framework enables a uniform treatment
of all available input information information, i.e., both
observed time series data and the parameters of the model.
We determine the prior means by averaging published
clinical data weighted in proportion to the sample size of
each study. To account for differences between reported
estimates of parameters due to, e.g., possible variabil-
ity of model parameters between different locations, the
tolerance parameters ∆α were estimated as unweighted
root-mean-square deviations of the published data from
their respective average values Θ
(0)
α across the different
studies. As a result, our procedure is flexible with re-
spect to any local variability in model parameters. If high
quality local data on parameter values are available for
calibration, as might be the case for the duration of ICU
stays or severity models, these data can be used directly
with small values (or zero) for the respective tolerance pa-
rameters. By forcing parameters with known values to be
more tightly constrained, unknown parameters will be au-
tomatically optimized with respect to all data types, and
we can thus increase the fidelity of our model calibration
result.
Many of our model outputs and data quantify daily
incidences, e.g., the number of deaths per day. For these
sorts of rate data, a Poisson likelihood estimator is appro-
priate. For a data point d at time t, the Poisson likelihood
is given by
L(λ|t, d) =
(
e−λ(t)λ(t)d
d!
)1/T
, (19)
where the time-dependent rate λ(t) is equal to the model
output and T is the correlation time for the data. The
likelihood over the full data set is the product over the
likelihoods for each individual data point; thus, the total
log-likelihood is given by
ln
[
L( ~D|~Θ)
]
=
∑
i
di lnλ(ti)− λ(ti)− ln (di!)
Ti
. (20)
In addition to being a well-motivated choice when com-
paring count data to rates, the Poisson likelihood is ap-
pealing because its effective uncertainty scales with the
6rate parameter. Thus, unlike with the L2 norm, a single
parameter specifies both the expectation value and the
uncertainty of the measurement. In practice, we found
that evaluating likelihoods using the L2 norm did not
significantly alter the qualitative features of our forecasts.
We divide by T in Eq. 20 because we also calibrate
against instantaneous hospital statistics, such as occu-
pancy in the general ward and in the ICU. These data
sources have natural correlation timescales: occupancies
correspond to smoothed averages since the majority of
individuals who occupy a bed do so continuously over
several days. We set T equal to the correlation timescales
Θ(0) from our priors. In particular, we assume a correla-
tion of 6 days for occupied hospital beds, and a correlation
of 12.75 days for occupied ICU beds. We set T = 1 for
the raw incidence data, i.e., for daily hospital deaths and
for daily total deaths.
In Table I, we enumerate the model parameters we
sample over and list the bounds on those parameters’ val-
ues. We also describe the shape of any prior distributions
we impose. In our model, we use gamma distributions
to describe delays, and specify the mean and standard
deviation for each distribution. Here, the mean τ and
standard deviation σ of a gamma distribution are related
to the standard shape and scale parameters by k = τ2/σ2
and θ = σ2/τ , respectively. We fix the serial interval
mean and standard deviation to 4 and 3.25 days respec-
tively [24, 25], while our incubation time distribution
has fixed mean 5.5 days and a standard deviation of 2
days [26, 27]. Parameters for all other delays are sampled.
Finally, we implement MCMC sampling using the
Python package emcee [33]. To improve sampling effi-
ciency, we use ensemble move proposals based on the dif-
ferential evolution [34], differential evolution snooker [35],
and kernel density [36] proposal updates.
B. Posterior distributions and data fitting
We calibrate our model using data on hospital and ICU
room occupancy by COVID-19 patients, the number of
daily deaths of COVID-19 confirmed patients in hospitals,
and the total number of daily deaths as publicly reported
by the IDPH [37]. At the time of calibration, the hospi-
talization and ICU data were not publicly available and
were provided to us by the IDPH. The MCMC sampling
procedure produces a high-dimensional posterior proba-
bility. We use this posterior to identify the expectation
values and uncertainties for each parameter with respect
to the model and the data.
To summarize the posterior distribution in terms of
epidemic trajectories, we take a representative sample of
parameters ~Θi according to their posterior probabilities.
For each ~Θi, we simulate the full course of the epidemic,
and we plot the resulting family of curves in aggregate.
At every time point we identify the median values of
all measurable quantities (hospital and ICU rooms, and
bounds Θ(0) ∆
R0 [1, 5] – –
ts [35, 65] – –
t0 [60, 85] – –
t1 [70, 100] – –
M(t1) [0.05, 1] – –
IFR [0.25%, 1.8%] 0.7% 0.175?
τh [0.5, 40] 6.5 2
σh [0.5, 20] 4 2
τdisch [0.5, 40] 6 2
σdisch [0.5, 20] 4 2
pc [0.05, 4] – –
τc [0.5, 10] 2 2
σc [0.5, 10] 2 2
pd [0.05, 3] – –
τd [4, 20] 12 3
σd [1, 20] 8.5 3
τrec [4, 20] 12.75 3
σrec [1, 20] 10 3
Ftot [1, 10] – –
τtot [0, 10] 2 1
σtot [0, 10] 2 1
ASF [0, 0.2] – –
TABLE I. Specification of sampler parameters and their pri-
ors. The mean and standard deviation of a delay-time PDF
Kx are denoted by τx and σx respectively, and probabilities
px denote the overall scaling of the age distribution px,i as
specified in Table S1. In addition to the listed bounds on the
various scaling factors px, we also enforce that the number
of individuals drawn from a state does not exceed the total
number presently in that state. We indicate strict bounds on
parameter values and provide the mean Θ(0) and standard
deviation ∆ for parameters’ Gaussian priors where specified.
Our priors on Kh, Kr, Kc, and Kd are informed by Refs. [27–
31], and use Ref. [32] to set our prior on ln IFR.
?We implement a Gaussian prior for ln IFR, with mean corre-
sponding to IFR = 0.7% and variance of ln IFR set to 0.175.
deaths) as well as quantiles corresponding to 68.4% and
95.6% confidence intervals. Because these quantiles are
evaluated independently at each point in time, the visually
recognizable curves do not correspond to actual epidemic
trajectories.
III. MODELING RESULTS
We used our age-of-infection model to describe the
progression of COVID-19 in Illinois during 2020. We
performed analyses for the state and for four distinct
localities of the state. We also considered three separate
scenarios of social distancing in our modeling.
A. Simulations for Illinois
In Fig. 2 we show the fits and predictions of our model
for the entire state of Illinois assuming that once im-
7plemented, the state-imposed and self-regulated social
distancing behavior of the population maintains the same
level until the end of the simulation. We report the me-
dian and the 68.4% and 95.6% confidence intervals of
several dynamical outputs of our model, obtained from an
ensemble of forward simulations that sample the posterior
distribution over model parameters. Fig. 2 presents three
separate calibrations: (a) using data up through April
20, 2020 and assuming a fixed seasonal forcing ampli-
tude ASF = 0.2, (b) again using data through April 20,
2020 but instead sampling over ASF, and (c) using data
through May 17, 2020 and sampling over ASF.
First, comparing panels (a) and (b) demonstrates that
a 20% seasonal forcing effect produces a worse projection
and may be an overestimate; while our model does not
infer the origin of any yearly, periodic modulation to
Rt (or lack thereof), by mid May the forecasts disagree
with the data. By contrast, the uncertainty introduced
by sampling ASF produces a more robust fit to the long
plateau exhibited in all data sources. Next, comparing
panels (b) and (c) shows that while short-term predictions
are broadly consistent, the spread of model forecasts
become narrower. In particular, including data up to May
17, as in panel (c), enables the model to identify that the
plateau is beginning to bend, in contrast to the model
shown in panel (b), in which a continued plateau is not
precluded. We investigate the predictive power of our
model and calibration procedure in the next subsection.
Hospital and ICU occupancy as well as deaths related
to COVID-19 exhibit a long plateau spanning from the
beginning of April through at least mid May. This behav-
ior is not just due to the fact that mitigation reduced Rt
to almost exactly one, but also because of the variance
in when the lagging indicators respond to the rate of
infection. Namely, while the various non-pharmaceutical
interventions (NPIs) implemented in Illinois occurred on
relatively short timescales (as can be seen in the sudden
change of slope for the daily incidence of new infections
in Fig. 2), the variance in the delays between when indi-
viduals become, e.g., symptomatic and then hospitalized,
introduces spread in the indicators’ responses to changes
in Rt. As an example, some portion of individuals in-
fected before any mitigation takes place will continue to
be admitted to the hospital well after mitigation occurs.
Indeed, this variability compounds with subsequent tran-
sitions, such that daily deaths, being the final indicator,
exhibit the most gradual change in incidence rate. Our
model’s generality to arbitrary delay distributions makes
it particularly well-suited to accurately capture this effect.
B. Robustness of predictions
In order to explore the predictive capabilities of the
model, we present a series of benchmark simulations to
compare the predictions of models calibrated with increas-
ingly recent data. In Fig. 3, we show the fits to hospital
beds occupied, ICU beds occupied, daily hospital deaths,
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FIG. 2. Fits and predictions of our model of the entire state of
Illinois under the continuation of the Stay-at-Home order and
social distancing measures, resulting from parameter inference
which (a) fixes ASF = 0.2 and calibrates to data through April
20, 2020, (b) samples ASF and calibrates to data through April
20, 2020, and (c) samples ASF and calibrates to data through
May 17, 2020. In each case, the data used for calibration is
denoted by crosses, while data from later dates (open circles)
allow a comparison of model predictions with subsequent real
world observations. Each panel’s vertical line marks the end
of data used for calibration. Solid curves denote median
model predictions at a given time, while the shaded regions
denote the 68.4% (darker shading) and 95.6% (lighter shading)
confidence intervals of a particular output. We depict the
daily incidence of new infections (green, solid), the number of
occupied hospital beds by confirmed or tentative COVID-19
patients (purple, dashed), the number of ICU beds occupied
by confirmed COVID-19 patients (orange, dot-dashed), and
total daily deaths of COVID-19 patients (light blue, dotted).
We remove reporting artifacts by plotting daily death data
smoothed by a 7-day running average.
and daily total deaths in the entire state of Illinois, cal-
8ibrating with data up to April 1, 2020, April 8, 2020,
April 20, 2020, and May 3, 2020. During the time period
studied here, the Illinois Stay-at-Home order was issued,
leading to an end to the exponentially growing phase of
the epidemic and a flattening of the curve. Due to transi-
tion delays, the quantities to which we calibrate exhibit
exponential growth as late as early April; for example, the
number of daily deaths does not flatten until around April
10, 2020. Thus, the above-specified dates of calibration
provide a test that measures the ability of our model to
anticipate the bending of the curve.
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FIG. 3. Robustness of simulations for the COVID-19 epidemic
in Illinois, evaluated by comparing 95.6% confidence regions of
predictions for parameter inference calibrated to data through
April 1 (light blue), April 8 (green), April 20 (purple), and
May 3, 2020 (red). The panels depict the number of hospital
beds occupied (a), the number of ICU beds occupied (b), and
the total daily deaths (c). In each panel, triangles depict the
data smoothed by a 7-day rolling average and grey crosses the
actual data.
As expected, simulations with earlier terminal calibra-
tion dates generate forecasts with larger, less restrictive
confidence intervals: with data from only the earliest
stages of the epidemic, neither continued exponential
growth nor successful suppression of infections due to
mitigation can be ruled out. Between April 1 and April 8,
however, ICU occupation stopped growing exponentially,
thereby providing the first indicator by which the model
can infer the effect of mitigation. Indeed, even the April
8 forecast anticipates the subsequent flattening in the
daily deaths curve. Later forecasts (e.g., that of April
20) remain consistent with the April 8 model, while also
favoring a continuation of the plateau over a more rapid
decline in use of hospital resources and deaths. Finally,
the May 3 model is largely consistent with the April 20
one, but begins to project a slight decline that agrees
with the new data. This latest forecast should not be
expected to lie strictly within the confidence interval of
the previous, as any future changes in mitigation cannot
be anticipated.
We also point out that the April 1 forecast for hospital
occupation spans several orders of magnitude on any given
day (as seen in panel (a) of Fig. 3). This is due in part to
the lack of hospitalization data that could provide direct
constraints, but is also an inevitable feature of a system
which exhibits exponential growth dynamics. Further-
more, we hypothesize that the lack of hospitalization data
before the beginning of the plateau is at least partially
responsible for the April 1 forecast for ICU occupation
and daily deaths being relatively unconstrained. Since
hospitalizations serves as the earliest available indicator
for the progression of the epidemic, we hypothesize that if
it were supplied with this data before April 1, the model
would have been able to discern that the data were no
longer consistent with an exponentially-growing epidemic.
This observation underscores the importance of rapid and
reliable reporting of hospitalization data—or even better,
robust and representative testing for positive cases— in
the context of modeling epidemic dynamics.
The disappointingly short horizon of predictability for
epidemic models when Rt > 1 shown here represents a
fundamental limitation of forecasting, in much the same
way that chaotic dynamics limits weather prediction, and
this issue has been noticed in other independent studies
[38–40]. However, the exponential sensitivity has a silver
lining: small changes to transmission can have large im-
pacts on the overall trajectory and fatality of the disease.
In summary, the model curves fitted after April 8, 2020,
i.e., with data from the plateau, follow the trends of
the data well. We conclude that the model can be char-
acterized as semi-quantitative and that it is capable of
capturing broad epidemic dynamics and fitting empirical
data. In this sense, it can serve as a useful tool to make
short term predictions that may be useful for planning
purposes.
9C. Regional modeling
To account for differences in the epidemic in different
parts in the state, we simulate the epidemic trajectory in
the four distinct Restore Illinois regions separately. Each
of these “super-regions” is composed of multiple of the
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) regions defined by
the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) [41].
The Northeast super-region includes the city of Chicago
and its suburbs, EMS regions 7 through 11. The North-
Central super-region contains EMS regions 1 and 2, the
Central super-region EMS regions 3 and 6, and finally the
Southern super-region comprises EMS regions 4 and 5. In
the absence of detailed transportation data, we assume no
population transfer between these super-regions, and so
unlike, e.g., the model for the state of Georgia in Ref. [42]
and Italy [23], our regional modeling is not a genuine
metapopulation model for the state.
In Fig. 4 we show the fits and predictions of our model
calibrated to data up to May 17, 2020 for each of these
four regions. We report inferred model parameters in
Table S2. Our median estimates of the basic reproduction
number R0 at the start of the epidemic are consistently
above 1, ranging from 2.4 ± 0.16 for the Northeastern
region including Chicago and its suburbs to 1.7± 0.16 for
the Central region including the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
The per capita daily deaths and illnesses is at least
ten-fold higher in Chicago and its suburbs compared to
the downstate areas of Illinois. This is likely due to
increased contact density in the upstate region, reflected
by a higher initial R0 ≈ 2.3 compared to ≈ 1.8 in the
downstate regions, coupled with the fact that mitigation
began earlier relative to the start of the epidemic in some
downstate regions. In regions where the virus entered
the population later, the epidemic had a shorter phase of
unmitigated exponential growth.
The values of Rt corresponding to the post-mitigation
basic reproduction number are very close to 1, reflecting
the approximately constant number of hospital and ICU
beds occupied by COVID-19 patients and daily deaths
from COVID-19 in different super-regions in Illinois dur-
ing much of April and May 2020.
D. Evaluation of parameter fits
In Fig. 5, we show a subset of the joint posterior prob-
ability distributions for model parameters relevant to
the parameterization of the mitigation factor M(t) as
specified above, fitting to data shown in Fig. 2. The
correlations between some pairs of fitted parameters, e.g.,
between R0 and the start date of the epidemic ts, are
reflected in the ellipsoidal shape of the posteriors. This
is sensible: the later the epidemic begins, the larger the
basic reproduction number must be in order to fit the
data.
In Table S2, we report the parameter values our model
infers when fitting to data for different regions of the
state and over different time ranges. We also report the
effective reproduction numbers Rt as evaluated on May
1, 2020. On May 1, 2020, Rt appears to have barely
dropped below unity, suggesting that mitigation efforts
may have only marginally halted the exponential growth
of the epidemic at that time.
E. Comparison with mobility data
While our model does not provide a microscopic descrip-
tion of social interactions and movement in the population,
we may evaluate our fitted M(t) relative to social mobility
indices derived from cell phone data [43, 44]. In the top
panel of Fig. 6, we plot the time dependence of several
mobility indices reported by Google [43] for the entire
state of Illinois, measuring change in visits to destina-
tion points categorized as retail and recreation, grocery
and pharmacy, parks, transit stations, and workplaces.
The Unacast mobility data [44] is shown in bottom panel
of Fig. 6, depicting an effective distancing metric and a
measure of trips to so-called non-essential destinations.
Remarkably, although the model is supplied with no
prior information on non-pharmaceutical interventions,
the inferred dates and magnitude of mitigation agree
with the start and end dates of the largest drop in both
sets of mobility data. Comparing to the Google mobility
data, our M(t) curve exhibits an amplitude, start date
and end date consistent with indices corresponding to
retail and recreation, transit stations and workplaces. On
the other hand, parks and grocery and pharmacy show
a more modest reduction which still matches the time
frame of M(t). In the Unacast data, both metrics also
appear to match the time-dependent change in M(t).
Note that both datasets evince increased movement at
later dates. Because we here parameterize mitigation as
a single transition, our fits to M(t) would not reproduce
this recent increasing trend.
Our procedure is distinct compared to several previous
efforts to incorporate mobility into models of COVID-19
dynamics, which either impose that changes in transmis-
sion coincide with known dates of non-pharmaceutical
interventions, or scale Rt according to reductions in mo-
bility [45, 46]. The fact that our model independently
recovers a trend in mitigation consistent with mobility
measures speaks to its flexibility and calibration proce-
dure.
IV. WHAT-IF SCENARIOS
We now consider possible future scenarios and alter-
native historical scenarios in which non-pharmaceutical
interventions are lifted or were never implemented at all.
The former enables a model-based assessment of the risk
of, e.g., lifting Stay-at-Home orders on a certain date,
while the latter demonstrates the impact that previously-
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FIG. 4. Fits and predictions of our model under the baseline scenario with the Stay-at-Home order and social distancing
maintained until October 1, 2020. The model is calibrated with data (crosses) through April 20, 2020 separately for each of the
four super-regions of the state: (a) North-Central, (b) Northeast, (c) Central and (d) Southern. The data from later dates
(open circles) were not used in our fits and allow a comparison of model predictions with real world observations. Solid lines
of different denote the median model prediction at a given time. The shaded regions denote the 68.4% (darker shading) and
95.6% (lighter shading) confidence intervals, obtained as quantiles of an ensemble of forward simulations which sample the
posterior distribution over model parameters. We depict the daily incidence of new infections (green, solid), the number of
occupied hospital beds by confirmed or tentative COVID-19 patients (purple, dashed), the number of ICU beds occupied by
confirmed COVID-19 patients (orange, dot-dashed), and total daily deaths of COVID-19 patients (light blue, dotted). We
remove reporting artifacts by plotting daily death data smoothed by a 7-day running average.
implemented measures have already had on outcomes.
Our analysis focuses on two key measures for guiding
and justifying policy decisions: the stress imposed on the
healthcare system and the death toll.
A. No Stay-at-Home order
We first investigate the trajectory of the COVID-19
epidemic in Illinois in the absence of any form of social
distancing or mitigation measures, whether self-imposed
or mandated by the government. We conclude that rate of
hospital-bound deaths, ICU bed occupancy, and hospital
bed occupancy would be higher than what actually took
place by an order of magnitude or more, as shown in
Fig. 7. The Stay-at-Home order and self-imposed social
distancing measures were clearly crucial to flattening the
curve.
In Ref. [47] we made an early estimate of the ICU uti-
lization in the city of Chicago under two scenarios: one
in which the Stay-at-Home order was issued on March
20, 2020, and another in which the order was delayed by
20 days. Under the first scenario, the ICU utilization by
COVID-19 patients never exceeded the number of ICU
beds not occupied by other patients, while under the sec-
ond scenario it exceeded ICU capacity by nearly a factor
of ten. This example highlights the cost of mistiming in
NPIs [48]. In spite of inevitable uncertainties associated
with these early estimates, that work correctly identified
the timing of the peak in ICU demand to happen on
or around April 22, 2020. However, the magnitude of
this peak was underestimated in this study, because the
scenario assumed that post-mitigation value of Rt = 0.9
would be achieved by social distancing. In reality, the
response of the population to the Stay-at-Home order
in Chicago was somewhat weaker resulting in a larger
value of Rt and about a three-fold higher peak ICU bed
occupancy than we had predicted.
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FIG. 5. Joint posterior distributions of pairs of the main
parameters of our model fitted to the all-state data in Illinois
up to May 17, 2020. The variables shown are the initial value
of the reproduction number, R0, the mitigation factor M(t1),
the start date of the epidemic ts, the day the mitigation factor
begins to deviate from 1, t0, and the day the mitigation reaches
its asymptotic value, t1.
B. Partial removal of Stay-at-Home order
The state of Illinois lifted its original Stay-at-Home
order on May 30, 2020 [1]. In Fig. 8 we consider two
scenarios for the lifting of Stay-at-Home orders for the
entire state of Illinois. In the first scenario, mitigation
effects are completely removed and M(t) = 1 for times t
after June 1, 2020. We also consider the more conservative
case that mitigation recovers by 30% to M(t) = M(t1) +
0.3(1 − M(t1)) for t after June 1, 2020. This second
scenario assumes that a combination of self-regulation
and remaining government-imposed mitigation measures,
such requiring wearing masks, banning large gatherings,
etc., results in only a partial reduction of the effective
mitigation factor.
The first scenario exhibits a substantial second wave,
with rapid and strong peaks in all quantities occurring
successively through the month of July. In the second,
weaker (and perhaps more realistic) scenario, a second
wave still occurs but does so later and with a reduced
peak height. In this case, the peak demand for hospital
and ICU beds and number of deaths are reduced.
An aggregated model of the entire state does not de-
scribe its heterogeneous population structure, which may
be particularly important in forecasting beyond the lifting
of the Stay-at-Home order. We now report separately the
results of modeling the expiration of the Stay-at-Home
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
so
ci
al
d
is
ta
n
ci
n
g
fa
ct
or
(a)
retail and recreation
grocery and pharmacy
parks
transit stations
workplaces
M(t)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
so
ci
al
d
is
ta
n
ci
n
g
fa
ct
or
(b)
distance metric
non-essential visits
M(t)
Ma
rch
1
Ma
rch
15
Ap
ril
1
Ap
ril
15
Ma
y 1
Ma
y 1
5
Ju
ne
1
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
R
t
(c)
FIG. 6. The time-dependent mitigation factor M(t) defined
in Section I A as inferred from model fits compared to measures
of mobility in Illinois provided by Google (a) and Unacast (b).
In (c), we also plot the inferred evolution of Rt as defined
in Eq. 3, which we draw from a calibration to data from the
entire state of Illinois through May 17, 2020. Shaded regions
denote the 68.4% (lighter shading) and 95.6% (darker shading)
confidence intervals, while the solid curve denotes the median.
(with a 30% reduction in mitigation) in each of the four
aforementioned super-regions, with the caveat that we are
unable to take into account possible transfers of people
between the regions. As in Fig. 9, we first calibrate models
using data through May 17, 2020, imposing again that mit-
igation recovers by 30% to M(t) = M(t1)+0.3(1−M(t1))
for t after June 1, 2020.
In each super-region, a second wave is clearly visible, as
all four populations still today have a significant number
of infectious people at large. Although the Northeast
region, which includes Cook County and metropolitan
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FIG. 7. Counterfactual simulation of the COVID-19 epidemic
in the absence of government or population self-imposed social
distancing measures. The model is calibrated to data through
April 20, 2020 (crosses); we then artificially set M(t1) = 1, i.e.,
assume no mitigation ever takes place. The data from later
dates (open circles) are not used in our fits and demonstrate the
effect that real-world NPI strategies had on the epidemic. We
depict the daily incidence of new infections (green, solid), the
number of occupied hospital beds by confirmed or tentative
COVID-19 patients (purple, dashed), the number of ICU
beds occupied by confirmed COVID-19 patients (orange, dot-
dashed), and total daily deaths of COVID-19 patients (light
blue, dotted). We remove reporting artifacts by plotting daily
death data smoothed by a 7-day running average.
Chicago, has the biggest second wave in absolute numbers,
its relative impact on the epidemic trajectory is smaller
merely because the epidemic has not declined to the same
extent as the other three regions. Under the worst case
scenario, the more sparsely populated Southern, Central,
and North-Central regions have relatively larger second
waves because the epidemic as of yet is relatively less
active in those regions compared to the Northeastern
region, which includes Chicago and its suburbs.
We note that the magnitude of the second wave may be
containable if rapid and efficient testing, contact tracing,
and isolation mitigation strategies are employed [49, 50].
Following standard protocols [51], we estimate that even
if purely manual contact tracing is employed for all three
stages of tracing (case identification, tracing, and follow-
up), the number of contact tracers required is approxi-
mately 8.3 times the daily number of new cases identified.
A considerable reduction in workforce and an increase in
efficiency can be obtained by electronic measures. Never-
theless, the potential magnitude of the second wave in this
scenario suggests that contact tracing will be challenging
and require extraordinary resources to execute.
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FIG. 8. Simulation of different scenarios for relaxation of
the Stay-at-Home order for the entire state of Illinois. Each
panel’s vertical line marks the end of data used for calibration.
We display two scenarios: (a) where the mitigation actor M(t)
returns to 1 on April 24, 2020, corresponding to a complete
lack of social distancing, and (b) where on June 1, 2020 the
effect of NPIs is reduced by 30%.
V. DISCUSSION
Modeling plays an important role in the societal re-
sponse to the COVID-19 pandemic, and a variety of
approaches are used to inform public health policy, guide
resource allocation, and plan non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions [52]. The present study of the spread of COVID-19
in Illinois reveals both the strengths and limitations of
modeling, and provides potentially actionable insights
into the future spread of the disease. We begin with some
technical points and best practices that we have developed
during our work.
Model calibration: Our analysis highlights the importance
of choosing appropriate data with which to calibrate mod-
els, and to perform calibration with precision. Due to the
large number of parameters that inevitably enter epidemi-
ological models, calibration requires parameter inference
in a high dimensional space with strong potential for im-
proper fits resulting from failure to reach global optima.
Although the MCMC methods we use are computationally
intensive, they are relatively efficient in exploring high
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FIG. 9. Fits and predictions of our model under the a partial release of the Stay-at-Home order on June 1, 2020 to a mitigation
factor M(t) = M(t1) + 0.3× (1−M(t1)). The panels and and plots denote the same regions and data sources as those in Fig. 4.
dimensional, multi-modal distributions, and converge to
well-behaved global posterior probability distributions.
Bayesian inference enables the incorporation of previous
studies (e.g., meta-analyses) to provide reasonable priors
on parameters which are poorly constrained by the avail-
able data. As an example, although the data we calibrate
to does not constrain the prevalence of the infection, we
systematically account for this uncertainty by informing
our prior on the infection-fatality rate (IFR) from sero-
logical studies [32]. The IFR is an important variable
in terms of disease outcomes, and so model predictions
must systematically account for the uncertainty in this
variable.
In our analysis, we have taken data at its face value.
A more thorough analysis could account for differences
in the trustworthiness of data, e.g., programmatically
dealing with uncertainties associated with classification
of early hospital admissions as either COVID-positive or
under investigation. Such an approach might also be able
to consider the number of individuals who test positive
for the virus. Furthermore, because we do not explicitly
treat underreporting, data from early in the epidemic may
be biased low.
Error estimation: The MCMC procedure generates a
complex, high dimensional probability distribution that
may be sampled to estimate future epidemic trajecto-
ries. While one might be tempted to simply generate
the maximum likelihood trajectory for forward (in time)
simulation, this can be misleading. The probability dis-
tribution of trajectories may have a maximum likelihood
trajectory that is favored only slightly above other trajec-
tories yet is noticeably different from the mean or median
estimator. We thus sample trajectories forward in time,
and at each time point we evaluate the median and confi-
dence intervals of outputs. Although the curves we depict
do not correspond to a trajectory that would be realised in
practice, together with confidence intervals, they provide
a meaningful description of the range of forecast results.
Robustness: In order to ascertain the predictive power of
our model, we assessed to what extent it was able to make
predictions beyond the range of data to which it had been
calibrated. We first considered a rather severe test: how
far in advance can the model predict the abrupt flattening
of the epidemic curves that occurred after April 10, 2020?
Unsurprisingly, the answer here was not particularly en-
couraging because the curves dramatically switch from
exponential growth to a phase of much slower variation
or plateau. We were only able to fit daily death and ICU
occupancy data before the flattening, since hospitalization
data was not available until mid-April. As a result, none
of the information feeding into the model dynamics were
able foreshadow the onset of the plateau.
Nevertheless, such self-consistency checks are impor-
tant validations of the modeling process, and should be
attempted if there are early enough data available. En-
couragingly, the range of our model estimates decreased
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in a hierarchical and consistent manner, with projections
from earlier points in time bounding later projections. Of
course, it is not possible for our model to predict future
changes to the strength of mitigation. Furthermore, our
mitigation model only implements a single event and thus
cannot account for future short term changes. Real world
considerations, such as holidays and quarantine fatigue,
would be inconsistent with our mitigation model approxi-
mation on long timescales. As such, we do not necessarily
expect future predictions (which could account for future
changes in mitigation) to lie within the confidence bounds
of older ones.
Correlation with mobility data: For policy and planning
purposes, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness
of various measures in mitigating the epidemic relative
to their, e.g., economic costs. Although epidemiological
modeling can in principle provide insight into the former
issue, doing so would require a more fundamental descrip-
tion than the one presented here, for example making use
of agent-based models [12, 13, 16] or employing spatially-
structured and heterogeneous network descriptions [15].
Mean field models, which assume a well-mixed popula-
tion, do not capture the microscopic effects that could be
correlated to specific mitigation strategies.
Nevertheless, mobility data present a potential means
to guide and evaluate which policies and social interven-
tions lead to the strongest reduction in disease trans-
mission. While our treatment does not provide such a
description or analysis, the correlation between the ef-
fective measure of the impact of NPIs, M(t) (see Eq. 3),
and mobility data presented in Fig. 6 is striking. Note
that in contrast to Ref. [46], we do not use the mobil-
ity data as an input to our calculations. Although our
model makes no claims about the effect of changes in
the reported mobility indices, this observed correlation
encourages more detailed modeling to evaluate the im-
pact of different social distancing measures. Furthermore,
our results support the utility of anonymized, aggregated
mobility data as a potential low-latency measure of the
impact of, e.g., government-mandated social distancing
measures on actual population movement, especially since
such indicators may provide a predictor of the measures’
influence on epidemic dynamics. A robust understanding
of the mechanistic relationship between mobility measures
and the spread of the infection could also guide efficient
testing and contact tracing strategies, for example using
risk-based surveillance methods [53, 54].
Spatial heterogeneity: In reality, the entire state of Illinois
is not a single well-mixed system, even if such approx-
imations are frequently made [2, 15, 16]. Illinois has
a densely populated region in the northeast, and more
sparsely populated regions further west and to the south.
Our modeling identified that the status of the epidemic
(and the projections for scenarios in which mitigation is
relaxed) differ among the four super-regions. In particu-
lar, in the Southern and Central regions, the epidemic is
declining more rapidly, due to a combination of social dis-
tancing and contact tracing using pre-existing resources.
Modeling these regions separately, and including popu-
lation transfer between them, is essential to guide the
implementation of region-dependent mitigation strategies
and to provide input to policy makers to prevent the
resurgence of the epidemic.
Relaxing mitigation: Our simulations suggest that it is
too soon to lift all social distancing and mitigation restric-
tions, as the significant number of currently-infectious
individuals would make a second wave inevitable. The
dynamics of a second wave and the approach to herd
immunity may be crucially sensitive to effects beyond a
mean-field description. For example, we do not account
for super-spreader events which have played a major role
in the spread of SARS and MERS [10, 11, 13] and are
likely also relevant for COVID-19 [55]. Similarly, we do
not account for heterogeneities in the population struc-
ture. Such features may accelerate the onset of herd
immunity which in turn decreases Rt. These differences
have the potential to decrease the severity of the second
wave and may enable more efficient containment. We
defer a treatment of these effects to future work.
Additional limitations: We end with a brief discussion
of additional limitations. First, the importance of spa-
tial structure, heterogeneities in population susceptibility,
and social network structure are well-appreciated in the
literature [2, 12, 15]. We plan to investigate methods
to model these effects and their impact on our results in
future work. In addition, important sources of error in our
existing model include the unknown impact of seasonal
forcing, the discreteness of populations, and the effect of
super-spreader events and behavioral response.
In our initial modeling [47], we used seasonal forcing
with ASF = 0.2 because similar effects had been docu-
mented for historical coronaviruses [19]. Because seasonal
forcing varies slowly with time, it remains difficult to
verify this assumption with the observables we consider.
Nevertheless, our parameter inference does not exhibit
strong evidence for this level of seasonal forcing; the role
of climate in the early stages of epidemics is a question
of active investigation [56, 57]. Furthermore, non-zero
values for ASF do not necessarily ascribe an equivalent
seasonal modulation to the disease’s infectivity.
In addition, we wish to comment on the reported con-
fidence intervals obtained from parameter inference for
both stochastic and deterministic epidemic models [58],
because these can depend on whether or not the model
calibrations are performed for raw data or cumulative
data. Generally speaking the estimated intervals are un-
realistically small when models are fit to cumulative data
[58], with stochastic models giving slightly larger intervals.
Our calculations are calibrated to raw data not cumula-
tive data, and so we do not expect the uncertainties in
general to be estimated inappropriately. Regardless, any
deterministic model of the epidemic trajectory will be
inappropriate when few individuals are infected, in spite
of apparent certainty in posteriors. Thus, in a regime
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where the deterministic model is not even appropriate
as a first approximation, i.e., small populations, the es-
timate of uncertainties will not be a good indicator of
the inapplicability of the deterministic model. More-
over, it is well-known in ecology that the discreteness
of populations—the fact that individuals are quantized
and that birth-death processes are discrete—leads to im-
portant qualitative phenomena ranging from population
cycles [59] to noise-induced pattern formation [60, 61].
These effects are particularly important when numbers
are small in the early and late stages of the epidemic
because our mean-field model is incapable of representing
the extinction state, i.e., when the number of infectious in-
dividuals drops below one. Once the epidemic is extinct in
a particular region, it can only re-emerge due to migration
events, e.g., a super-spreader event like when university
students return to campus. In this regime, a prudent re-
gional health department uses contact tracing to contain
outbreaks. Such mechanisms are not represented in our
modeling.
The third major limitation is that modeling an epidemic
is very different from modeling a physical system, even
one as complex as a weather pattern. The transmission
of an infectious disease involves a collaboration between
the virus and the host population: the host population
alters its behavior in response to its awareness of epi-
demic progress, leading to policy steps that may increase
or decrease transmission, and self-regulation of social dis-
tancing by susceptible and vulnerable populations. Thus,
it is important to emphasize that predictions can easily be
invalidated due to subsequent human actions that cannot
be anticipated, and will be impossible to model precisely.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a mathematical
model and computational framework for recapitulating
the COVID-19 epidemic. This model may be used to infer
values for the parameters that drive and represent the
progression of the disease. We use our calibrated model
to provide robust short-term forecasts of the epidemic
trajectory in different regions of the state and explore the
effects that steps to relax social distancing measures may
have, especially in the context of a second wave of the
epidemic. The resulting highly-constrained and quantita-
tive narrative of the epidemic is a useful tool to inform
scenarios for sustainable monitoring and control of the
epidemic.
CODE AVAILABILITY
The model and calibration framework described above
have been implemented in the open source Python
3 [62] package pydemic. The source code for py-
demic is freely available online at https://github.com/
uiuc-covid19-modeling/pydemic. This work made use
of NumPy [63], SciPy [64], pandas [65], emcee [33], cor-
ner.py [66], and Matplotlib [67].
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
We detail the parameterization of our age-dependent severity model below. As noted in Section I A, we track the
number of individuals in different age groups separately, and thus we specify the fiducial transition probabilities for
each age group independently. We further define an overall scaling prefactor px that governs the final transition
probability px,i as the product of the fiducial rate and the prefactor. Our fiducial transition rates px,i/px are drawn
from Ref. [28, 68–70].
In Table S1 we list the age-dependent values for the probabilities that: infected individuals experience symptoms
pσ,i/pσ, symptomatic individuals are hospitalized ph,i/ph, hospitalized patients enter the ICU pc,i/pc, and ICU patients
expire pd,i/pd. We also list the relative age distribution of the population in the United States, which we source from
the UN [71]. As specified in Table I, we sample over the pc and pd scale factors.
TABLE S1. Table of age-specific parameters, including the age distribution wi and the various probabilities of transitioning
between various states in our model. We present the unscaled distribution px,i/px, where px denotes the overall scaling which is
sampled during parameter inference (or whose value is otherwise set as described in the text).
[0, 10) [10, 20) [20, 30) [30, 40) [40, 50) [50, 60) [60, 70) [70, 80) [80,∞)
wi 0.120004 0.127891 0.139256 0.134948 0.121898 0.12725 0.116278 0.0727565 0.0397193
pσ,i/pσ 0.057 0.054 0.294 0.668 0.614 0.83 0.99 0.995 0.999
ph,i/ph 0.001 0.003 0.012 0.032 0.049 0.102 0.166 0.243 0.273
pc,i/pc 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.063 0.122 0.274 0.432 0.709
pd,i/pd 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Because the data to which we calibrate does not constrain the symptomatic population, we cannot observe ph and
so we fix it to one. We force our model to produce a given infection fatality ratio by setting pσ to
pσ =
IFR∑
i wi(pσ,i/pσ)pc,iph,ipd,iFtot
, (S1)
where the value for pσ,i/pσ on the right hand side of the equation is taken first from Table S1. This equation is valid if
the initial infected population is distributed in proportion to wi.
In Table S2, we summarize the posterior probability distribution for all sample parameters enumerated in Table I.
Figure S1 shows joint posterior distributions for all pairs over the complete set of parameters of our model fitted to
all-state data up to May 17, 2020 as shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 2.
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TABLE S2. Table of inferred model parameters for disease severity and the time dependence of mitigation effects. Mitigation
was modeled with a piecewise Hermite cubic interpolating polynomial as described in Section I A. Each column reports median
parameter values from the MCMC algorithm for the different model fits along with the largest of the upper and lower one-sigma
error bounds reported by the algorithm. In addition, we report the (derived) values and uncertainties of Rt (as defined in Eq. 3)
for each model as evaluated on May 1, 2020. The column headers specify the modeled region of Illinois and the inclusive end
date of the calibration data.
Illinois (5/17) Illinois (4/20) Northeastern (5/17) North-Central (5/17) Central (5/17) Southern (5/17)
R0 2.2± 0.26 2.2± 0.25 2.3± 0.28 1.6± 0.38 1.6± 0.4 1.6± 0.33
ts Feb 15± 3.92 Feb 14± 4.24 Feb 16± 3.73 Feb 16± 7.82 Feb 18± 8.25 Feb 17± 8.40
t0 Mar 9± 4.13 Mar 10± 4.13 Mar 9± 4.04 Mar 8± 5.71 Mar 8± 6.08 Mar 11± 7.62
t1 Mar 20± 2.94 Mar 21± 3.28 Mar 20± 3.01 Mar 24± 6.04 Mar 25± 6.58 Apr 4± 5.53
M(t1) 0.48± 0.051 0.47± 0.048 0.45± 0.048 0.64± 0.12 0.61± 0.12 0.59± 0.099
Rt(May 1) 0.94± 0.01 0.97± 0.037 0.94± 0.011 0.99± 0.02 0.95± 0.023 0.9± 0.027
IFR 0.007± 0.0012 0.0071± 0.0012 0.007± 0.0012 0.007± 0.0012 0.007± 0.0012 0.007± 0.0012
τh 6.3± 2 6.2± 2 6.2± 2 6.1± 1.8 6.2± 1.8 6.9± 1.8
σh 2.3± 1.4 2.2± 1.6 2.4± 1.7 4.2± 1.9 4.2± 1.9 4.6± 1.7
τdisch 7± 1.9 6.9± 1.9 7.1± 1.9 6.2± 1.7 6.6± 1.8 6.8± 1.9
σdisch 6.1± 1.8 5.7± 2 6.4± 1.7 3.5± 1.7 4.6± 1.9 5± 1.8
pc 0.61± 0.16 0.67± 0.18 0.62± 0.17 0.47± 0.14 0.32± 0.097 0.51± 0.14
τc 1.4± 0.97 1.7± 1.3 1.3± 0.93 3± 1.6 2.2± 1.5 2± 1.3
σc 2.2± 1.8 2± 1.8 2.3± 1.9 2.5± 1.6 2.5± 1.7 2.7± 1.7
pd 1.4± 0.15 1.3± 0.16 1.4± 0.16 1.6± 0.3 1.9± 0.25 1.9± 0.26
τd 8.8± 0.96 7.7± 1 8.8± 0.98 13± 2.1 8.9± 1.6 11± 1.4
σd 4.6± 1.5 3.7± 1.5 4.7± 1.6 9.2± 2.4 7± 2.7 6.6± 2.2
τrec 11± 2.3 12± 2.5 11± 2.3 12± 2.8 12± 2.8 12± 2.8
σrec 6.8± 2.7 8.7± 2.9 6.9± 2.7 10± 2.8 10± 2.8 9.9± 2.9
Ftot 1.4± 0.033 1.3± 0.06 1.4± 0.034 1.2± 0.14 1.6± 0.3 2.1± 0.28
τtot 2.9± 0.46 2± 0.53 2.8± 0.47 2.2± 0.88 2.3± 0.91 2.8± 0.88
σtot 2.3± 0.88 1.9± 0.84 2.2± 0.86 2.1± 0.91 2± 0.92 1.9± 0.91
ASF 0.15± 0.03 0.06± 0.071 0.11± 0.035 0.13± 0.065 0.12± 0.07 0.13± 0.073
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FIG. S1. Joint posterior distributions of pairs of the complete set of parameters of our model fitted to the all-state data up to
May 17, 2020. The correlations between some pairs of fitted parameters such as, e.g., between R0 and that start date of the
epidemic are reflected in the ellipsoidal shape of the posteriors. This is an expanded version of Fig. 5
